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Game theory has been successfully applied in modeling the evolutionary processes in natural world. Certain paradoxical situations [1, 2] in animal conflicts have been explained by the game theory. The concept of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) was introduced by Maynard Smith and Price [3] . An ESS is a strategy, which if adopted in a conflict by a population, can withstand a small invading group. The ESS is thus stable and persists through time. ESS is a central idea in the Evolutionary Game Theory: a branch of the Game Theory dealing with evolutionary games. An evolutionary game means a model of strategic interaction continuing over time in which higher payoff strategies gradually displace strategies with lower payoffs. There is also some inertia involved to distinguish between evolutionary and revolutionary changes. Inertia means that aggregate behavior does not change too abruptly.
What evolution may have got to do with quantum mechanics? The concept of an ESS developed from applying the ideas of game theory to animal conflicts and recently certain ideas of game theory have been extended to quantum domain [4, 5] . We think that recent work on quantum theory of games can provide a link between the theory of evolution and quantum mechanics. If the genes engage themselves in selfish games [6] played at molecular level where quantum mechanics decides the rules then it is interesting to speculate about the quantum analogues of ESS's. If the games of survival between animals give rise to ESS's then what about the possibility of quantum games among the molecules of the genes giving rise to quantum strategies that are stable and persist through time. Such Quantum Evolutionary Stable Strategies (QESS's) may have interesting characteristics like their classical counterparts. They may be immune from invasion from other mutant quantum strategies. We consider the question of mutant quantum strategy trying to invade other classical or quantum ESS in a population engaged in a pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma.
We will consider the symmetric version of the pairwise game where all members of the population are indistinguishable and each player is equally likely to meet any other player. In the Prisoner's Dilemma game the classical available pure strategies are Cooperation (C) and Defection (D) [7] . An interesting question is what strategies are likely to be stable and persistent in a population engaged in the pairwise game of Prisoner's Dilemma. A simple analysis [8] show that D will be the pure classical strategy prevalent in the population. Suppose that a strategy A is played by almost all members of the population, the rest of the population form a small group of mutants playing strategy B constitute a fraction ǫ of the total population. The strategy A is said to be Evolutionary Stable (ES) [9] against
is defined as the payoff to player playing A against player playing B, for all sufficiently small, positive ǫ.There exists some ǫ o , such that for ǫ ∈ [0, ǫ o ) the inequality is satisfied [9] . If for the given A and B the ǫ o specified is as large as possible the ǫ o is called the "invasion barrier". If B comes at a frequency larger than ǫ o it will lead to an invasion.
It follows [8, 9] that A is an ESS with respect to
(1) If most of the players play A, then almost all potential opponents are A players, so if A does better against A than B does, B players will be persistent losers as the game evolves. However, if A and B do equally well against A, then how well the strategies perform against B becomes important. Therefore, for A to be ES against B the strategy A must then do better against B than B does against B. . Strategy A is an ESS if A is ES against all B = A. For A and B available pure strategies (classical or quantum) the corresponding fitness' [8] can be defined as
Where F A and F B are the classical frequencies of the pure strategies A and B respectively. Generally a quantum strategy cannot be treated as a probabilistic sum of pure classical strategies except under special conditions. Therefore for finding fitness the quantum strategies are treated as 'new' strategies that cannot be reduced to the pure classical strategies.
We assume the same quantum version of Prisoner's Dilemma, as described in [4] between two players. The pair of qubits are prepared in unentangled state |CC and sent through the entangling gate J. J is essentially a unitary operator known to both players and is symmetric with respect to the interchange of two players. The two players, who can be differentiated as focal and the opponent, then apply their local unitary operators U f oc and U opp respectively. An inverse gate to J is applied before the final measurement by the arbiter. Call s f oc the focal strategy and s opp the opponent strategy. The payoff table is the same as chosen in [4] and can be written as 
The expected payoffs to the focal and opponent players are [4] : Eisert and Wilkens [4] have used following matrix representations of the unitary operators of one and two-parameter strategies respectively.
Where θ ∈ [0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2]. The classical pure strategies C and D are realized as C˜U (0), D˜U (π) respectively for one-parameter strategies and C˜U (0, 0), D˜U (π, 0) respectively for twoparameter strategies.
We consider three cases: (i): A single parameter quantum strategy [4] appearing as a mutant strategy against the strategy D existing as a classical ESS.
(ii): A two parameter quantum strategy [4] appearing as a mutant strategy against D.
(iii): A two-parameter quantum strategy appearing as a mutant strategy against the quantum strategy Q existing as a quantum ESS, where
The expected payoffs are found as
So that the first condition for an ESS is satisfied and D˜U (π) is the ESS. The case θ = π corresponds to the case when one-parameter mutant strategy coincides with the ESS and is ruled out. If D˜U (π) is played by almost all the members of the population, which correspond to high frequency F D for D, then W (D) > W (θ) for all θ ∈ [0, π). Therefore the fitness of a one-parameter quantum strategy, which also corresponds to the case of mixed (randomized) classical strategies [4] , cannot be greater than that of a classical ESS. A one-parameter quantum strategy, therefore, cannot succeed to invade a classical ESS.
Case (ii):
The expected payoffs are Case (iii) It is shown [4] that the quantum strategy Q˜U (0, π/2) played by both the players is the unique Nash equilibrium and one player cannot gain without lessening the other player's expected payoff. The expected payoffs are
and φ ∈ [0, π/2] except when θ = 0 and φ = π/2 which is the case when the mutant strategy U (θ, φ) is the same as Q and is ruled out. Therefore the first condition for Q to be an ESS is satisfied. The condition P (Q, Q) = P (U, Q) implies θ = 0 and φ = π/2. We have the situation of the mutant strategy to be same as Q and we neglect it. If Q is played by the most of the players, meaning high frequency
for all θ ∈ (0, π] and φ ∈ [0, π/2). Therefore a two parameter quantum strategy U (θ, φ) cannot invade the quantum ESS (QESS), the strategy Q˜U (0, π/2), for this particular game.
An ESS is usually considered another refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. The relationship is described as [11] △ ESS ⊂ △ P E ⊂ △ N E and △ P E = Φ where △ N E , △ P E and △ ESS are the sets of symmetric Nash equilibrium, symmetric proper equilibrium and Evolutionary Stable Strategies respectively. Application of quantum theory enlarges the set of Nash equilibrium strategies △ N E . So that the sets △ P E and △ ESS are also enlarged and △ ESS may contain quantum strategies as well. For the Prisoner's Dilemma game we have shown that any two-parameter quantum strategy with φ > arcsin(1/ √ 5) will invade and will be a new QESS. Not every quantum strategy can successfully invade. For example in the above case a quantum strategy with φ < arcsin(1/ 5) is not a successful invader for a classical ESS.
Conclusion:
The central concept of evolutionary game theory i.e. the Evolutionary Stable Strategy can be extended to quantum domain. By considering the pair-wise game of Prisoner's Dilemma played in a population it has been shown that if the players have got the option of playing quantum strategies then the classical strategy of Defection, existing as an ESS, can easily be invaded (when φ > arcsin(1/ 5)) by a two parameter quantum strategy. However a two-parameter quantum strategy Q˜U (0, π/2) existing as a QESS is able to withstand invasion by a small group using other two-parameter quantum strategies. Game theorists working in Biology have found that a single dimension mutant cannot invade but if two things can be changed at once then invasion is possible [12, 13] . How this observation can be related to the case of a two parameter quantum strategy succeeding to invade an classical ESS is a question under our present consideration.
